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Cost-Benefit Analysis 
and Ethics 
 
Part I: History and Basic Design 
 
Finn Arler 
 
 
The purpose of this and the following chapter is threefold. Firstly, I will 
write a short history and present the basic assumptions of cost-benefit analy-
sis. Secondly, I will present some of the basic features of cost-benefit analy-
sis as a planning tool. Thirdly, I will bring special attention to some of the 
main ethical difficulties which one is inevitably faced with when using cost-
benefit analysis as a planning tool. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (or, as it is usually called in the U.S.: benefit-cost anal-
ysis) is not an altogether unambiguous concept. To begin with one can dis-
tinguish between two kinds of cost-benefit analyses. On one hand, there is 
the specifically economic kind of analysis, which emerged together with 
microeconomics and neoclassical economics during the 19th century. In this 
case the value or significance of everything needs to be expressed in mone-
tary terms and based on people’s willingness to pay for it. On the other hand, 
there is a broader kind of analysis, which is not exclusively economic in this 
sense, but includes assessments with at least some descriptions of costs and 
benefits expressed in non-economic and qualitative terms.  
 
In general, though, the term ‘cost-benefit analysis’ refers to the quantitative 
economic kind of analysis. Even then, however, it is necessary to distinguish 
between two approaches to the valuation procedure (Campen 1986, 26f). On 
one hand, there is the “conventional” approach which sees cost-benefit anal-
ysis as applied welfare economics with its standard valuation techniques. On 
the other hand, there is the “decision-making” approach, which holds that the 
actual decision-makers should influence evaluations related to key parame-
ters like, for instance, risk and uncertainty, the relative weight attached to the 
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interests of different social groups, or non-economic elements like loss of 
human lives, irreversible environmental impacts, etc. The conventional ap-
proach, where the analyst takes on the role of a neutral expert who only re-
lies on mainstream economic methods and principles like efficiency and 
maximization of economic benefits, is the most commonly used of the two. 
 
Thirdly, one can distinguish between private and public cost-benefit analy-
sis. In the first case the point of view is that of the private company or con-
sumer, and only the company’s or consumer’s own interests are relevant. In 
public cost-benefit analysis, on the other hand, the point of view is that of 
the society at large, hence all interests become relevant. Public costs-benefit 
analyses can either take a local, national or global point of view depending 
on the issue that is being considered. In the first two cases only a specific 
group of interests are included, whereas the last kind takes account of all 
interests on an equal basis. Again, in general, the term ‘cost-benefit analysis’ 
refers to economic evaluations of public projects and policies, and more 
often than not from a national point of view where only the country’s own 
citizens have standing (Boardman et.al. 1996, 43f). 
 
Fourthly, it is necessary to distinguish between ex ante and ex post cost ben-
efit analyses. Most cost-benefit analyses are completed before (ex ante) a 
decision is made about a certain project or policy. It can also be made after-
wards (ex post), however, in order to make sure whether the decision was 
economically sound (or whether the previous ex ante analysis was reliable), 
or it can be revised continuously along with the execution of the decided 
project or policy (in medias res).  
 
 
Basic assumptions in cost-benefit analysis 
 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is a sub-department of welfare economics which again 
is a sub-department of ethics (Little 2002). Or, to be more precise: cost-
benefit analysis is a tool that is designed to support ethical and political deci-
sion making by using a specific set of simplified assumptions.  
 
Firstly, it is assumed in cost-benefit analysis, in accordance with its utilitari-
an origins, that the goal of society is to maximize private utility, which in 
turn may be equalled to maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain (for a 
further analysis of origins, see Arler 2005). This can be difficult to measure, 
however. Welfare economists, therefore, have reformulated the goal to max-
imize preference satisfaction, assuming that preference satisfaction causes 
pleasure. People’s preferences are revealed through their willingness to pay 
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as consumers. The welfare of two persons can easily be compared, then, 
because the values of their satisfaction of preferences are commensurable 
and directly measurable by their willingness to pay for it.  
 
Secondly, it is assumed that, in general, the market is the best allocator in 
terms of efficiency related to preference satisfaction. If the market is left to 
work on its own without public interference, a balance or equilibrium occurs 
automatically – a balance which can never be exceeded by human planning. 
Public interference should therefore only be considered in cases where the 
market for some reason fails to do a proper job. 
 
The basic assumptions in cost-benefit analysis can be summarized in the 
following list of assertions: 
 
- The common good or social utility can be reduced to an aggregation of 
the utilities of individuals. Society is conceived as the sum of individuals 
interacting to their mutual advantage. 
- The complete utility related to an individual can be reduced to an aggre-
gation of separable preference satisfactions, no matter how and why these 
may happen to be attained. 
- In order to avoid double-counting, individual preferences are assumed to 
be related only to consequences for the individual him- or herself. They 
do not include political preferences for more equality in society, for in-
stance, or preferences for other people’s flourishing, unless this is re-
flected explicitly in the individuals’ market behaviour. Even if the indivi-
dual can be observed to be willing to pay for these goods, it is often as-
sumed that what he or she is actually paying for is some kind of personal 
satisfaction such as the “warm glow” following from virtuous acts or 
peace of mind.  
- The marginal utility of goods is diminishing. For each extra unit of a 
certain good one gets, less utility is obtained compared to the previous 
units (unless otherwise proven).  
- In general, desires or preferences are revealed through individuals’ beha-
viour on the market, and their intensities (together with their expected du-
ration and certainty) can be measured by the consumers’ willingness to 
pay.  
- The market provides a balance or competitive equilibrium, where social 
utility is maximized, as long as no market failures occur.  
- Consequently, public interference is only appropriate in cases of market 
failure. 
- In these cases the aggregated costs and benefits of possible interferences 
should be measured through calculations based on shadow pricing, where 
ideal market processes are imitated as far as possible.  
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- Prospective projects and policies should be ranked in accordance with 
their benefit-cost ratio, and the one with the highest score should be im-
plemented first. Implementation of the remaining projects and policies 
should be continued until the public budget is used up, or the one combi-
nation of projects and policies should be chosen which maximizes net 
benefits within the budgetary limits. 
 
One of the most basic assumptions is that, due to the efficiency of the mar-
ket, it is only in cases of market failure that public interference is needed for 
adjustment. This is done through the construction of theoretical markets, 
which as far as possible reflect the observed normal market behaviour of 
individuals. This is where cost-benefit calculations become relevant.  
 
 
Cost-benefit analysis – a short history  
 
 
Although the first study which may be called a cost-benefit analysis was 
carried out by the French Abbé de Saint Pierre, who studied the utility of 
public road improvements in details as early as in 1708, a more systematic 
treatment did not emerge until a group of French engineers at the École Na-
tionale des Ponts et Chaussées made an effort to develop methodical proce-
dures in the spirit of the Scottish philosopher Adam Smith and his French 
adherent Jean-Baptiste Say in the first half of the 19th century (Ekelund & 
Hébert 1999). These engineers saw the purpose of public works explicitly as 
one of redressing market failures, wherefore their utility needed to be ana-
lysed in market terms.  
 
The culmination of this theoretical effort was a series of influential articles 
written by the French engineers Auguste Cournot and Jules Dupuit in mid 
19th century. In these articles they developed a number of points which are 
often associated with the so-called founding fathers of micro-economics, 
who wrote their most influential books in the second half of the 19th century. 
Dupuit, in particular, is recognized as the inventor of the so-called marginal 
utility analysis, where the value of a project is measured by the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for marginal benefits in a situation, which is assumed to 
be close to a competitive equilibrium (Dupuit 1844/1952).  
 
Despite the efforts of the French engineers and a few other early attempts 
cost-benefit analysis in the spirit of neoclassical economics was not system-
atically applied until 1936, where the U.S. Flood Control Act required that 
the expected benefits from planned flood-control projects should exceed 
their presumed costs (Campen 1986; Hufsmith 2000). This act was part of 
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the New Deal anti-depression program of President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
focusing on the creation of new jobs and giving new stimulation to the econ-
omy after the great Wall Street collapse. The Flood Control Act was the 
main result of a process where new planning instruments were introduced by 
the National Planning Board which was established in 1934, and the issue of 
flood control – or, more generally, management of water resources, includ-
ing flood control, water supply, irrigation, navigation, hydropower, and later 
on: water-related outdoor recreation and water quality – became the spear-
head of the introduction of cost-benefit analysis as part of public administra-
tion in the U.S. 
 
In the following years various committees related to the public management 
of water resource continued to develop the principles and standards used in 
cost-benefit assessment. The most significant result of this process was the 
publishing of the report Proposed Practices for Economic Analysis of River 
Basin Projects by the Sub-Committee on Benefits and Costs of the Federal 
Inter-Agency River Basin Committee in 1950. This report, which soon be-
came known as the Green Book, for a long time set the standard for the con-
struction of cost-benefit analysis in relation to public investments (Hufsmith 
2000, Caulfield 2000, Kneese 2000, Pearce 1998). It explicitly used some of 
the controversial principles developed in neoclassical welfare economics, 
particularly in relation to the accounting of secondary costs and benefits on a 
national scale (“to whomsoever they may accrue”) and to discounting future 
costs and benefits based on opportunity costs of capital rates, i.e. the rates 
which could be obtained from the most beneficial alternative investments. It 
also triggered a heavy activity in developing cost-benefit analysis in various 
research institutions, of which the Harvard Water Program was the most 
influential. The Green Book was never fully adopted by the Federal Com-
mittee, however, due to disagreements about which secondary costs to in-
clude. 
 
The basic principles and procedures recommended in the Green Book were 
adopted by the U.S. Bureau of the Budget in their Budget Circular A-47 
from 1952. This Circular was used by the Bureau on all water related pro-
jects during the 1950’s, the peak period of dam building, although with a 
strong emphasis on primary regional benefits. Since then cost-benefit analy-
sis has been a recurring feature in U.S public regulation, and from the early 
1960’s – when the Circular A-47 was replaced by the broader Senate Docu-
ment 97 (Caulfield 2000) – it was adopted in other public investment pro-
grams, and along with the growth of government spending during the 1960’s 
it was applied in new areas like transportation, health, and safety regulations 
(Campen 1986, 20). In general, however, the programs were still designed 
from a multiple purpose approach, where objectives like expenditure con-
straints, equitable income distribution, regional development, human health 
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effects, and, only marginally, preservation of environmental quality were 
assessed along with that of economic efficiency. The programs did not try to 
measure these impacts in monetary terms, but considered them as ‘incom-
mensurables.’ 
 
This problem, particularly in relation to externalities, became a major issue 
of research in the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which presi-
dent Richard Nixon established in 1970 (Pearce 1998, U.S. EPA 2003), and 
where various indirect “revealed preference” techniques were explored, de-
spite the fact that cost-benefit analysis was prohibited in relation to some of 
the basic environmental laws – the Clean Air, Clean Water, and Endangered 
Species Acts – from the early 1970’s (Cropper and Oakes 1992, 675; Arrow 
et.al. 1996, 4; Nash 1989). At that time cost-benefit analysis had obtained a 
rather nasty reputation due to a series of studies, which mainly served as 
mere window dressing for predetermined positions on some dubious water 
regulation projects. In 1976, a congressional sub-committee went as far as to 
conclude that cost-benefit analysis to a large extent was used as “an effective 
disguise for subjective advocacy” (Campen 1986, 52). 
 
The EPA-research did help cost-benefit analysis getting a comeback as a 
primary tool in public regulation, particularly because health and environ-
mental issues, hitherto largely ignored, were now included in the studies. 
Consumer valuations of externalities were inferred from property pricing in 
areas of high environmental quality, transportation costs to nature sites, etc. 
These techniques were, particularly in the 1980’s, supplied by “stated pref-
erence” techniques like the so-called contingent valuation based on Willing-
ness-To-Pay surveys. This technique had been suggested as early as in 1947 
by the economist Ciriacy-Wantrup, but it was not generally recognized until 
a couple of EPA-conferences in the 1980’s brought it into mainstream eco-
nomics (Hanemann 1994). The methods were acknowledged officially in the 
U.S. in the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act, which included recognition of rights to sue for damages on 
non-use values. This inclusion later on led to a heated debate on existence 
value and liability of contingent valuation, particularly after the Exxon Val-
dez accident in 1989 (Portney 1994). 
 
The essential idea was to internalize the externalities into the cost-benefit 
planning method in order to be able to use a coherent evaluation scheme 
without ‘incommensurables.’ During the last three decades of the 20th centu-
ry EPA funded more than 450 studies focusing on methods for economic 
analysis, particularly on measuring environmental costs and benefits (U.S. 
EPA 2004). 
 
Arler  ·  607 
 
Cost-benefit analysis was officially recognized as a basic tool in U.S. federal 
planning when, in February 1981, president Reagan signed the Executive 
Order 12291, which required that federal regulatory agencies use cost-
benefit analysis (as the basic part of the so-called Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis, RIA) on proposed regulations which are estimated to cost more than 
$100 million. This was not all too radical a change, however, as previous 
presidents had already encouraged economic efficiency assessment of public 
investments, and although ‘cost-benefit analysis’ was not explicitly men-
tioned in president Jimmy Carter’s Executive Order 12044 from 1978 or in 
President Ford’s Executive Order 11281 from 1974, the weighting of eco-
nomic gains and losses were nevertheless strongly recommended as part of 
what Ford called Inflationary Impact Assessment (later renamed to Economic 
Impact Statement) and Carter called Regulatory Analysis (RA) (Campen 
1986, 20; U.S. EPA 2003). So it was in President Bill Clinton’s Executive 
Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review from 1993 recommending 
Economic Assessments (EA), which through the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) still sets the standard for economic evaluations of public 
initiatives. 
 
In the period following Reagan’s Executive Order the focus was turned from 
public project investments to policies and regulatory actions, and the implicit 
aim was to prevent “over-regulation” (Pearce 1998, 87; Campen 1986, 54f). 
‘De-regulation´ and ‘efficiency in public expenditure’ became the new 
buzzwords, not only in the U.S., but in many other parts of the world as well. 
Cost-benefit analysis does not a priori recommend deregulation and privati-
zation, however, even though the strong commitment to market mechanisms 
obviously pulls in this direction. 
 
 
Core elements and principles  
 
 
According to the neo-classical paradigm cost-benefit analysis should only be 
used in cases where public interference becomes relevant due to the presence 
of a market failure. Some of the most common cases are: 
 
- When the market cannot provide certain goods without public planning 
and/or interference. This is primarily the case in relation to the basic in-
frastructure: transport systems, water supply systems, sewage systems, 
waste management systems, energy transport systems, research facilities, 
etc., and to their regulatory and institutional setting: energy policy, trans-
port policy, agricultural policy, cleaner technology policy, etc.  
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- When public projects may help the market getting started again in cases 
of regression and unemployment (although not all welfare economists 
would accept interferences in this case).  
- When the values of some costs or benefits, the so-called externalities, are 
not registered on the market. This is first and foremost the case with cur-
rent and future environmental and health effects like the consequences of 
an enhanced greenhouse effect, loss of biodiversity and nature quality, 
eutrophication, toxic or eco-toxic chemicals, etc. 
 
The essential idea of the method is to compare a scenario, which includes the 
realization of a promising project or policy (or the closing of a problematic 
project/policy), to a scenario without this project or policy and/or to scenari-
os with alternative projects or policies. The basic principle is that the one 
project or policy should be chosen, which leads to the scenario which scores 
best in economic terms. Present as well as future cost and benefits are esti-
mated through so-called shadow pricing, i.e., the consumers’ expected will-
ingness-to-pay on the margin, assuming that the market is working close to 
its optimum (within certain unalterable constraints). In principle, all those 
projects or policies should be realized, which come out of the analysis with a 
positive score, and therefore potentially enhance the welfare of at least one 
individual without declining the welfare of others (who can, in principle, be 
compensated).  
 
Projects and policies with a positive score thus pass the so-called potential 
Pareto-improvement test in accordance with the so-called Kaldor/Hicks cri-
terion: a project or policy is an improvement, if, in principle, the gainers 
could compensate the losers even if they do not. It is only a potential im-
provement according to the Pareto criterion, because somebody is actually 
going to be worse off without compensation. It is generally accepted as the 
basic criterion in cost-benefit analysis, though, for pragmatic reasons – al-
most no project would comply with the strict Pareto criterion – assuming 
that in the end there will be a balance between gainers and losers of different 
projects and policies, or that everybody will gain from general economic 
improvements. 
 
In the following paragraphs the typical steps of the analysis are presented. 
Apart from a few minor variations, the overall design of the procedure is 
generally accepted (cf. Campen 1986, U.S. EPA 1983/1991, OMB 1996, 
Layard & Glaister 1996, Boardman et.al. 1996, Finansministeriet (Danish 
Ministry of Finance) 1999, U.S. EPA 2000, Møller et al. 2000). What is 
much more controversial, however, is the choice of assumptions and meth-
ods used in each of the procedural steps as well as the range of impacts to 
include. I shall return to some of these controversial issues in the following 
chapter. 
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Step 1: Identify the problem (market failure)  
and seek promising solutions 
 
According to the neoclassical economics paradigm, the standard problems, 
which justify public action, are market failures. The identification of a mar-
ket failure and the justification for public action is therefore the first step in 
cost-benefit analysis. For example, although it seems reasonable to build a 
bridge across a river in order to save time, and many truck and car drivers 
can be expected to be willing to pay their tiny part of it, no private company 
may be ready to initiate the construction right away due to the high construc-
tion costs, the risks involved, existing public plans and regulations, etc. So 
the market cannot solve the problem without a certain amount of public in-
volvement.  
 
The next step is to find the most promising projects (or changes in public 
regulations) which could solve the problem at hand. In the case mentioned, 
building a bridge may seem the most obvious solution, but there may also be 
other ways to solve the truck and car drivers’ inconveniences. More ferries, 
for example. The selected solutions can then be varied in many ways: time 
and scale, renting or purchasing, changing location, varying quality targets, 
etc. (cf. also U.K. Treasury 2000, 18). These are only the most obvious an-
swers, however.  More comprehensive kinds of planning policies – reloca-
tion of the local industries, for instance – may also help to solve the problem. 
In general, however, due to the neoclassical paradigm, these more compre-
hensive solutions are seldom tried, because they interfere more with the 
market mechanism, which is accepted as the most appropriate means to im-
prove public welfare. The general assumption has typically been that piece-
meal engineering, to use the Austrian philosopher Karl Popper’s expression 
(Popper 1974), is always preferable to comprehensive planning. 
 
With the move from project investment to policy and regulatory action as the 
main field for cost-benefit analysis, this has changed to some extent. Policies 
are always more comprehensive than projects. There are also usually more 
alternatives to choose amongst: improved information, command and con-
trol, performance-based standards, taxes, fees, charges, subsidies, marketable 
emission permit systems, deposit-refund systems, voluntary agreements, etc. 
The selection of alternatives depends not only on the nature of the issue at 
hand, but also on tradition, political signals, approach fashion, etc. 
 
In many cases a solution has already been proposed by the public authorities, 
and cost-benefit analysis is then applied in order to determine whether the 
proposed policy or project is as worthwhile as it seems to the authorities 
proposing it. Consequently, the analysis only covers a fairly narrow range of 
projects and policies, in most cases only the proposed project or policy in 
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various designs. In theory, the proposed project’s benefits should be com-
pared with those of all other possible projects, even in other policy areas 
(health policy, for instance), in order to find the most beneficial ones. In 
practice, this is never done (Boardman et.al. 1996, 13). In any case, there is 
inevitably a balance to be observed between thoroughness of analysis and 
limits of practicality (OMB 1996, 4 and 7). It is worth remembering that 
cost-benefit analyses are very costly. A ten year old study showed that the 
US Environment Protection Agency on average spent $700.000 (1996 pric-
es) on each analysis of proposed regulations which fulfilled the criteria in 
Reagan’s Executive Order (Boardman et.al. 1996, 12). 
 
 
Step 2: Define and delimit the impact analysis  
 
Next step is to define and delimit the analysis. There are three important 
questions to answer in advance. The first question is how many aspects of 
the project, the life cycle of a bridge, for instance, should be included. The 
standard answer is that all significant impacts should be taken into account, 
but significance is not always a quality, which is easy to agree upon. It is not 
altogether obvious which impacts to include. 
 
We are also faced with questions like how far away in time and space im-
pacts should be taken into account. Building a bridge will have consequenc-
es in many links, where the precise causal relationships are often difficult to 
specify. The well-known example from Chaos Theory of an Amazonian 
butterfly causing a storm in China when circumstances are right illustrates 
the difficulties involved in specifying the causal chains in an environment 
evolving in nonlinear processes. Conclusions are necessarily preliminary, 
uncertain, and very often based on controversial scientific knowledge. It has 
to be decided, too, which geographic as well as time scales to use. In prac-
tise, due to limited amounts of time and resources, only a rather narrowly 
defined part of the consequences is typically described. If, in accordance 
with the piecemeal engineering approach, the project or policy is considered 
as a marginal change – as is most often the case – this will often tend to 
make cost-benefit analysts use of a narrow definition, too. 
 
Secondly, before describing the impacts it is necessary to identify a baseline 
scenario against which the proposed policy or project should be evaluated. 
The specification of baseline conditions has significant influence on the final 
result. One possibility is simply to use status quo as baseline. Another is to 
pick the most likely scenario, if the policy or project is not carried through, 
based on relevant trends. In the previously mentioned bridge case, it can be 
estimated how traffic is likely to change over time, how the general econom-
ic state of affairs can be expected to alter, etc.  
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This kind of baseline scenario building is often burdened with huge uncer-
tainties. Several highly unpredictable factors are often of crucial importance 
in long-term scenarios. Let me just mention a couple of examples. Firstly, 
assumptions about technological innovation with and without a proposed 
project or policy are difficult to handle due to the very nature of innovation. 
What makes it even more difficult to deal with is the fact that technological 
innovation is not exogenous to the implementation of the proposed project or 
policy, but often to a large extent dependent on this (Löschel 2002). Second-
ly, assumptions about long time future demand cannot be anything but 
shaky; this is particularly true for goods like scarce environmental resources.  
 
In the OMB and EPA Guidelines, it is emphasized that the specification of 
baseline conditions is demanding on the “honesty and integrity” of the ana-
lyst, wherefore all assumptions should be clearly both identified and justi-
fied. The presence of components with great uncertainty and significant ef-
fect on the final results calls for the inclusion of more than one baseline in 
the analysis (U.S. EPA 2000, 21f; U.S. OMB, 9), but, again, this is seldom 
done. 
 
The third important question to answer is whether a local, national or global 
approach is most appropriate. This is a question of whose interests are rec-
ognized to have standing: only those of local people, the national or global 
human interests, or the interests of all including those of other species. One 
possible answer in cost-benefit analysis is that willingness to pay is the key 
to getting one’s interest into the account. This would not only exclude the 
interests of other species than humans, but also effects which are not recog-
nized by the potential victims (a market failure in itself).  
 
Another answer is that it is only necessary to include impacts on members of 
the political community who pays for the project. If the analysis is sponsored 
by a nation state, for instance, improvements of the trade balance of the 
country is counted on the positive side, even if this results in larger problems 
in other countries. Similarly, if only the net benefits of the paying local 
community is included, the costs of a project falling on neighbouring com-
munities within the same country become irrelevant, unless these losses are 
covered through national taxation.  
 
It is basically an ethical question to decide whose interests are recognized to 
have standing. The answer is not determined simply by the range of effects, 
but depends just as much on the understanding of the closeness of the rela-
tionships (human as well as inter-special) between the individuals affected 
by the impacts. To leave the decision to be determined by actual market 
behaviour is one possibility, of course. It is not a neutral one, however, but 
based on the rather precarious assumption that the market constitutes the best 
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decision procedure on ethical matters due to people’s general lack of mutual 
interest. 
 
 
Step 3: Describe the impact  
 
The probable changes caused by the project or policy in question are de-
scribed and measured in relevant units. In standard cost-benefit analyses it is 
paramount that all impacts are quantified either directly or by the use of in-
dicators. Whenever possible, impacts should be described in ways which 
turn them into potentially marketable goods. Otherwise it is more difficult 
later on to attach precise economic values to them. 
 
In order for impacts to be counted in the cost-benefit analysis, they need to 
have an impact on the preferences of human beings. Economists typically 
distinguish between different kinds of preferences. Some preferences are 
related to the direct or indirect use value of a good. Others are related to 
option value, i.e., the value of being able later on to use the good. This value 
is often determined as the expected future opportunities multiplied by some 
probability factor. Some economists estimate preferences related to so-called 
bequest value, i.e., the value (as experienced by current people) of leaving 
future generations, say, an area in good shape. This bequest value should not 
be mixed up with the actual value of a good (economically or otherwise) for 
future people. Finally, some preferences are related to existence value, i.e., 
the value (as experienced by current or future people) that something contin-
ues to exist even though it may have no present or future use value. Again, 
existence value should not be mixed up with intrinsic value (or inherent 
worth), i.e. the value or worth of entities which have their own good, inde-
pendently of the value attached to them by human beings. 
 
The inclusion of risk, i.e., the distribution of the probability of being hurt or 
injured by a project or policy, and uncertainty, i.e., the lack of precise 
knowledge about these (and other) probabilities, is a separate issue. In most 
cases, it is necessary to use average numbers as well as statistical probability 
estimates in relation to some of the costs and/or benefits of a project or poli-
cy. This is often a difficult task, because different scientists may have dis-
similar opinions on the issue at hand, or clear evidence is lacking. Full dis-
closure and transparency is therefore important, and assessments of a num-
ber of plausible alternative scenarios, or a sensitivity test reflecting the dif-
fering interpretations of experts, are often highly needed. Delphi methods or 
consensus meetings involving groups of disagreeing scientists have also 
been used. Here, again, there is balance to be observed between thorough-
ness of analysis and limits of practicality. In accordance with cost-benefit 
analysis’ focus on current consumer preferences, the actual consumers’ risk 
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valuations should be of particular interest, but these are seldom included. 
Sometimes a risk premium for particularly risk-averse individuals is consid-
ered, though (U.S. OMB, 18). 
 
 
Step 4: Attach economic values to the  
various kinds of impacts  
 
In order to be able to compare the various kinds of costs and benefits direct-
ly, these should all as far as possible be monetised, i.e., economic values 
should be attached to all impacts of the selected alternatives. In most cases, it 
is essential that all goods are measured with a precise value, and not just as 
more or less compared with other goods on a common scale. Some values 
can be measured directly on the market: labour costs, building materials, 
land, equipment, office facilities, etc. – assuming, contrafactually, a) that the 
market works in accordance with the theoretical ideal, and b) that, in general, 
the measured impacts continues to have the same relative value.  
 
Whenever there are obvious obstacles to this, like, for instance, the presence 
of monopolies, this should, in principle, be adjusted for in the analysis, but 
this is rarely done, and all the small market failures are simply ignored. An-
other problem, which is largely ignored, is the changing relative values of 
goods. This is particularly problematic in cases where long-term impacts are 
assessed, and even more so when future people’s preferences – and the re-
sulting market terns – need to be included. 
 
Cost and benefits are considered as opportunity costs, i.e., the economic 
value of benefits forgone or gained when a public project or policy is carried 
through, including costs of compliance, administrative costs, transaction 
costs, and time losses. In cost-benefit analysis, public project should, in prin-
ciple, always be measured against the best potential alternative, the benefits 
of which thus become the costs of the project (Layard & Glaister 1996, 1). 
The most straightforward way to measure these costs is to conceive of them 
as lost or gained consumer goods and – assuming the market to reflect the 
potential benefits of alternative applications – let opportunity costs equal the 
marginal costs as reflected in present prices on the materials, labour, proper-
ty, etc. needed for a proposed project together with the losses and gains of 
consumer opportunities experienced by individuals directly or indirectly 
affected by the project.  
 
Sometimes it is not as simple as this, though. For instance, if the market 
prices in an area can be expected to change significantly due to the imple-
mentation of the proposed project, i.e., when supply is inelastic to some 
extent, this will influence opportunity costs. If the market price of a good 
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becomes lower than a consumer would actually be willing to pay for it, 
measured by current market prices, there is, in accordance with neoclassical 
theory, a consumer surplus. Likewise, if the market price becomes higher 
than a producer would actually be willing to produce and sell a product for, 
there is a producer surplus. If a public project or policy changes the prices 
on certain goods, the positive or negative changes in consumer and producer 
surpluses are considered in the cost-benefit analysis. Lost or gained surplus-
es are accounted as positive or negative opportunity costs (the negative ones 
are sometimes referred to as deadweight loss), assuming that they would 
have been used or are going to be used or invested somewhere else. 
 
Another way to measure the opportunity costs of a public project is to meas-
ure the lost or gained investment opportunities in general. In this case it is 
not the opportunity costs of the specific materials, labour, etc. but of lost or 
gained capital in a more generalized sense. These costs, the so-called oppor-
tunity costs of capital include the not achieved returns from potential in-
vestments, typically measured on the basis of market rates of return. There is 
no clear and commonly accepted rule telling when opportunity costs are 
measured as either lost consumer goods or lost investment opportunities. 
They are only directly substitutable, however, if one assumes a consumer’s 
rate of time preference for consumption equal to the marginal rate of return 
of capital. Most cost benefit analyses treat opportunity costs as consumer 
costs and discount afterwards with a discount rate equal to the rate of return 
of investments (Arrow et.al. 1996, 130). 
 
Externalities are – positive or negative – incremental impacts, which are not 
valued directly on the market. Examples of these are losses or savings of 
human lives, injuries and inconveniences, time losses or savings, increases 
or reductions of risks, losses of populations of certain species, impacts on 
nature quality, scenic views, losses or improvements of ecological services, 
inconveniences for other species, etc. In all these cases economic values are 
attached otherwise through various kinds of shadow pricing, assuming con-
trafactually the presence of an ideal market for non-priced goods. 
 
This kind of shadow pricing can be done in a number of ways (cf., for in-
stance, Cropper & Oates 1992; Pearce & Moran 1994, chp. 5; Pearce 
1993, Appendix II; Hanemann 1994; Boardman et.al. 1996, chps. 10-12; 
U.S. EPA 2000, chp. 7). The general principle is that the measurement 
should be made in a way, which imitates the market mechanism as far as 
possible. For instance, non-prized goods like endangered species could be 
measured through so-called contingent valuation based on willingness-to-
pay or willingness-to-accept surveys, where a representative group of citi-
zens are asked, how much they would be willing to pay for saving the spe-
cies, or how much compensation they would demand if the species eventual-
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ly is lost. This is the stated preference approach, where individuals respond 
to hypothetical questions. 
 
Some cost-benefit analysts consider this to be a rather unreliable way to 
make evaluations, though, and they prefer to use indicators based on actual 
market behaviour. This is the revealed preference approach. An example of 
this is the so-called hedonic pricing, where certain amenity values – peace 
and quiet, environmental quality, closeness to the sea, significant views, etc. 
– are reflected in property value. Other examples are valuation of time sav-
ings for various kinds of drivers based on their income related to the time 
saved, valuation of nature sites indicated from the travel costs people are 
willing to pay to reach the sites, or occupational-risk premiums in wages, 
indicating individuals’ price for their willingness to accept incremental risks. 
Still another approach is to measure the expected costs of establishing alter-
natives to a lost good, the costs of cleaning an area after use, or the costs of 
re-establishing a lost good. This approach implicitly assumes that society 
(now or in the future) is willing to pay for the restoration. 
 
The selection of methods depends not only on the matter at hand, but also on 
the chosen scheme for weighting the various interests. One basic dilemma is 
whether all interests should be taken into account on an equal basis, inde-
pendently of ability to pay, or expected willingness to pay is a more proper 
measure. Most cost-benefit analysts tend to prefer the last solution, because 
it deviates less from what happens on real markets. 
 
 
Step 5: Discount for time to find present values 
 
All public projects and policies – building a bridge, for instance – have im-
pacts for several generations. Actually, and this is a theme well known from 
science fiction literature dealing with time machines, any project will have 
irreversible consequences with long chains of impacts. In mainstream cost-
benefit analysis, it is assumed that future costs and benefits should not count 
as much as current ones. They should be discounted or transformed to the 
so-called net present value by a discount factor 1/(1+r)t where r is the dis-
count rate and t is a time index (counting years from project start). In order 
to do this, it is necessary to set up a time scheme which shows when the var-
ious impacts are going to appear.  
 
The main reasons given for discounting are that a) people are in general as-
sumed to prefer to have current needs and wants satisfied rather than those 
they may have in the future, or b) technological improvement and economic 
growth in society is assumed to make people richer in the future, c) people 
are expected to care less and less about future people the further away they 
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are, because we know less and less about who they are and what they cher-
ish, or d) future costs and benefits are more uncertain, because unforeseeable 
events may change the whole scheme. I shall return to discuss the validity of 
these arguments in the next chapter.  
 
The choice of discount rate is extremely important in most assessments. In 
mainstream cost-benefit analysis it is often assumed that public investments 
displace private investments. Public investments should therefore do better 
in terms of interests than private investments; otherwise they should never be 
implemented. The right discount rate is accordingly believed to be the inter-
est rate of the best or at least the average private investments, the so-called 
private rate of return of investment, reflected in the market rate of return, for 
instance, of long-term relatively risk-free bonds or of the average invest-
ments (both adjusted for inflation). This way one gets an estimate of the 
opportunity cost of capital, i.e., the before-tax rate of return to incremental 
private investments or, in other words, the missed opportunities for profiting 
from alternative investments. In this case the discount rate will typically be 
somewhere between 6 and 12 percent per year. It is a problem for cost bene-
fit analysis, though, that there are several different market rates working at 
the same time due, for instance, to differences in risks (as perceived by the 
agents) in different areas.  
 
It is necessary to distinguish between marginal, short-term projects and 
comprehensive long-term policies. In relation to long-term projects and poli-
cies which cannot be considered to be marginal, one could easily end up in a 
contradiction, if a high market rate of return is used, because this would in-
evitably influence the general increase in per capita income or rate of 
growth of consumption – with a corresponding decrease in the marginal utili-
ty of net benefits – both of which are usually assumed to be lower than the 
market rate, typically some 1 to 3 percent per year, although higher in peri-
ods of rapid growth and lower in periods of recession. It should be noticed 
that this rate varies from country to country and from time to time so that, in 
principle, different rates ought to be used. In practice, the same rate is gener-
ally used on all impacts.  
 
 
Step 6: Add up costs and benefits 
 
If all costs and benefits of alternative solutions are valued with the same 
denominator, the final aggregation is simple. One can simply pick up all the 
pieces, collect them, and see how profitable the various solutions are. Still, 
the aggregation can be made in a less straight-forward way, if it is assumed 
that one monetary unit of costs and benefits is not equally valuable to all. An 
alternative to the simple aggregation would be to give asymmetrical weight 
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to the anticipated costs and benefits of different groups. The U.K. Treasury 
Green Book even demands that any lack of explicit adjustment for distribu-
tional impacts needs to be justified by the appraising agency (U.K. Treasury 
2000, 25). 
 
A weighted account seems particularly appropriate in cases where the poten-
tial Pareto-improvement (or Kaldor/Hicks) criterion is used, but individuals 
living under difficult circumstances are likely to get hurt. This choice would 
be consistent with various well-known ethical principles such as, for in-
stance, the classical hedonistic utilitarian law of declining marginal utility of 
money, according to which maximization of happiness (or of real utility) 
demands equitable distribution of wealth, as well as with John Rawls’ differ-
ence principle (or maximin principle), according to which “the higher expec-
tations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a 
scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of 
society” (Rawls 1973, 75). Following the first of these principles, one could, 
for instance, weight net benefits of various groups of people inversely pro-
portional to wealth or income. Following the second principle, one could, 
similarly, increase the weight of net benefits of people with possessions or 
income below a certain threshold.  
 
Apart from all the obvious practical difficulties of finding a reasonable way 
of doing this, a disproportionately weighted aggregation entails what many 
economists would see as the disadvantage of diverging the assumptions 
away from those working on the real market. For this reason mainstream 
economists avoid it: the two goals of maximizing wealth (“efficiency”) and 
of making the social distribution equitable (“equality”) should be kept sepa-
rate, and not be mixed up in the analysis. At least, they argue, weighted cost-
benefit analysis should never be made without a standard analysis to com-
pare with.  
 
Behind this recommendation lurks the general assumption, inherited from 
Adam Smith, that the market works best without interference, and that unfor-
tunate outcomes is adjusted in due course by the market itself; people who 
lose in one game are likely to win in another, if the wealth of society is kept 
at a maximum. It could also be argued, though, that cost-benefit analysis is 
just one out of several tools that support decision making and that tools 
works best when they are kept as clean as possible. It is up to the decision 
makers, then, to mix the tools in accordance with their own standards. 
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Step 7: Carry out sensitivity tests 
 
Due to all the controversial and precarious elements included in cost-benefit 
analysis, it is necessary to provide sensitivity tests based on alternative as-
sumptions in order to see if decisions related to any of these elements are 
crucial for the final result.  
 
Whenever this is the case, it is necessary to highlight the controversy by 
presenting conclusions of calculations based on alternative solutions to con-
troversial issues. The following list includes some of the typical controver-
sial and uncertain issues. 
 
- Losses of human lives, injuries and health problems. How should the 
value of statistical lives and statistical injuries be estimated? Should the 
statistical lives of various groups of people be valued differently?  
- Can value transfers from other studies be used in cases where data are 
sparse? Are the situations comparable, or, if not: how can they be made 
more comparable?  
- Losses of non-human species or populations and other non-marketed 
environmental goods. How should we estimate indirect use value, option 
value, existence value, and bequest value? Are all kinds of values covered 
by the analysis?  
- Discounting future impacts. Which discount rate(s) should we choose? 
Should all impacts be discounted? At the same rate?  
- Dealing with risk and uncertainty. Can risks be quantified in more than 
one way? Are expert estimates dissimilar? Are uncertainties significant?  
- Questions of standing. Whose interests should be included? Are some of 
the non-represented interests significant?  
- The question of baseline. Which variable factors and probable changes 
are included? Is there more than one reasonable estimate of social and 
technological development? How are future markets going to look like, 
and how can this be accounted for in the analysis?  
- The alternative scenarios. Which ones are chosen and what is included?  
- The theoretical framework. Do different economic theories assume diffe-
rent causal relationships?  
- The question of equity. How should the distributive impact be dealt with? 
How would different assumptions influence the result?  
 
If cost-benefit analysis shall be of any help in ethical and political decision 
making, it ought to highlight all controversial assumptions and present some 
thorough reflections on the impact of alternative assumptions. Otherwise 
cost-benefit analysis becomes totally unreliable and worthy of the bad repu-
tation it acquired in the seventies (and still has). It is true, of course, that 
there is balance to be observed between thoroughness and practicality, but 
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the sensitivity tests are the worst area to place savings, if a cost-benefit anal-
ysis should be worth the money. 
 
 
Step 8: Compare the outcomes and rank them 
 
Projects and policies with potential benefits, i.e., where the expected net 
present value is positive, should be ranked in accordance with their benefit-
cost ratio. The one with the highest ratio should be implemented. In princi-
ple, implementation of all projects and policies with positive score should be 
continued until the public budget is used up (or the best mix of projects with-
in the budgetary limits should be chosen). 
 
In most cases it not as simple as this, however. Many costs and benefits are 
difficult to monetise in an unambiguous way, and in order to provide a rea-
sonable foundation for political decision making it is necessary to present a 
number of impacts in a non-monetised way. This can be done, for instance, 
by the use of tables, where the importance of various hard to monetise im-
pacts is estimated on, say, a scale from 1 to 5, and the estimates are defended 
by arguments. The use of procedures like this violates some of the basic 
principles in mainstream cost-benefit analysis – the monetisation demand, 
reliance on consumer preferences, etc. – but it makes the final outcome more 
trustworthy as well as more useful. The hard to deal with issues are not hid-
den behind controversial methodological decisions. 
 
In practice, the ranking of projects and policies seldom follows the recom-
mendations of mainstream cost-benefit analysis, but includes various other 
kinds of considerations such as distributive effects and matters of equity, 
enforcement and compliance problems, incentives for innovation, regional 
development, strategic importance, consistency with national and interna-
tional legislation, etc. (cf. also U.K. Treasury 2000, 9f). I shall return to this 
at the end of next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
